The Effect of Third-Party Funding of Plaintiffs on Settlement

Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum ()

American Economic Review, 2014, vol. 104, issue 8, 2552-66

Abstract: A significant policy concern about the emerging plaintiff legal funding industry is that loans will undermine settlement. When the plaintiff has private information about damages, we find that the optimal (plaintiff-funder) loan induces all plaintiff types to make the same demand, resulting in full settlement; implementation may entail a very high repayment amount. Plaintiffs' attorneys with contingent-fee compensation benefit from such financing, as it eliminates trial costs. When the defendant has private information about his likelihood of being found liable, we find that the likelihood of settlement is unaffected. In both settings the defendant's incentive for care-taking is unaffected.

JEL-codes: D82 K41 L84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.8.2552
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