Details about Jennifer Reinganum

E-mail:
Homepage:	http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/econ/reinganum
Phone:	615-322-2937
Postal address:	Department of Economics 415 Calhoun Hall Vanderbilt University Nashville, TN 37235
Workplace:	Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Jennifer Reinganum.

Last updated 2021-12-24. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

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Working Papers

2017

1. Information suppression by teams and violations of the Brady rule
   Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics

2014

2. Settlement and Trial: Selected Analyses of the Bargaining Environment
   Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics View citations (2)
   Also in Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics (2014) View citations (2)

2013

3. Cumulative Harm, Products Liability, and Bilateral Care
   IAST Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST) View citations (8)
   See also Journal Article Cumulative Harm, Products Liability, and Bilateral Care, American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association (2013) View citations (8) (2013)
4. The effect of third-party funding of plaintiffs on settlement
   Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics View citations (2)
   See also Journal Article The Effect of Third-Party Funding of Plaintiffs on Settlement, American Economic Review, American Economic Association (2014) View citations (6) (2014)

2011

5. Cumulative Harm and Resilient Liability Rules for Product Markets
   Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics View citations (2)
   See also Journal Article Cumulative Harm and Resilient Liability Rules for Product Markets, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press (2014) View citations (19) (2014)
6. Economic Analysis of Products Liability: Theory
   Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics View citations (4)
   See also Chapter Economic analysis of products liability: Theory, Chapters, Edward Elgar Publishing (2013) View citations (17) (2013)
7. Search, Bargaining, And Agency in the Market for Legal Services
   Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics View citations (1)

2010

8. Clients, Lawyers, Second Opinions, and Agency
   Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics

2009

9. A Dynamic Model of Lawsuit Joinder and Settlement
   Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics View citations (3)
   See also Journal Article A dynamic model of lawsuit joinder and settlement, RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation (2011) View citations (12) (2011)

2008

10. Privacy, Publicity, and Choice
    Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics
11. Settlement
    Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics View citations (1)
    See also Chapter Settlement, Chapters, Edward Elgar Publishing (2012) (2012)

2007

12. Communicating Quality: A Unified Model of Disclosure and Signaling
    Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics View citations (6)
    See also Journal Article Communicating quality: a unified model of disclosure and signalling, RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation (2008) View citations (49) (2008)
13. Mass Torts and the Incentives for Suit, Settlement, and Trial
    Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics

2006

14. Hidden Talents: Partnerships with Pareto-Improving Private Information
    Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics
15. Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure
    Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics View citations (3)
    See also Journal Article Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen (2008) View citations (29) (2008)

2005

16. Economic Theories of Settlement Bargaining
    Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics View citations (25)
17. Imperfect Competition and Quality Signaling
    Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics View citations (10)
    See also Journal Article Imperfect competition and quality signalling, RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation (2008) View citations (51) (2008)

2004

18. Competition and Confidentiality: Signaling Quality in a Duopoly when there is Universal Private Information
    Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics View citations (2)
    See also Journal Article Competition and confidentiality: Signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information, Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier (2007) View citations (47) (2007)
19. Secrecy and Safety
    Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings, Econometric Society View citations (1)
    Also in American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings, American Law & Economics Association
    Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics (2003) View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article Secrecy and Safety, American Economic Review, American Economic Association (2005) View citations (34) (2005)

2003

20. Markets, Torts and Social Inefficiency
    Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics View citations (10)
    See also Journal Article Markets, torts, and social inefficiency, RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation (2006) View citations (37) (2006)
21. Speaking Up: A Model of Judicial Dissent and Discretionary Review
    Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics View citations (1)

2002

22. Exploiting Future Settlements: A Signalling Model of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses In Settlement Bargaining
    Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article Exploiting Future Settlements: A Signalling Model of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Bargaining, RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation (2004) View citations (4) (2004)
23. Market Structure and the Demand for Free Trade
    Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics
    See also Journal Article Market Structure and the Demand for Free Trade, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell (2004) View citations (10) (2004)

2001

24. Found Money? Split-Award Statutes and Settlement of Punitive Damages Cases
    Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics
    See also Journal Article Found Money? Split-Award Statutes and Settlement of Punitive Damages Cases, American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association (2003) View citations (17) (2003)

1994

25. Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations As Evidence in Court
    Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany
    Also in Working Papers, University of Iowa, Department of Economics (1991) View citations (1)
    Working Papers, University of Iowa, Department of Economics (1994)
    See also Journal Article Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court, RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation (1995) View citations (25) (1995)
26. Product Safety: Liability, R & D and Signaling
    Working Papers, University of Iowa, Department of Economics View citations (20)
    Also in Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany (1994) View citations (2)
    See also Journal Article Product Safety: Liability, R&D, and Signaling, American Economic Review, American Economic Association (1995) View citations (118) (1995)
27. Settlement Negotiations with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution and Efficiency
    Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (48)
    See also Journal Article Settlement negotiations with two-sided asymmetric information: Model duality, information distribution, and efficiency, International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier (1994) View citations (47) (1994)

1991

28. Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation
    Working Papers, University of Iowa, Department of Economics
    See also Journal Article Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press (1993) View citations (28) (1993)
29. On the Determination of Roles in Bargaining Models: Settlement Negotiations with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information
    Working Papers, University of Iowa, Department of Economics

1990

30. Equilibrium Enforcement and Compliance in the Presence of Tax Practitioners
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
    See also Journal Article Equilibrium Enforcement and Compliance in the Presence of Tax Practitioners, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press (1991) View citations (24) (1991)

1989

31. Expert Opinions and Taxpayer Comnpliance: A Strategic Analysis
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

1986

32. Credibility and Law Enforcement
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
33. Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
    See also Journal Article Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, American Economic Review, American Economic Association (1988) View citations (95) (1988)

1985

34. Settlement and Litigation Under Alternative Legal Systems
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

1984

35. A Model of Tax Compliance Under Budget-Constrained Auditors
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
36. An Equilibrium Model of Tax Compliance with a Bayesian Auditor and some 'Honest' Taxpayers
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
37. Sequential Equilibrium Detection and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Evasion
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

1983

38. A Two-Stage Model of Research and Development With Endogenous Second Mover Advantages
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
    See also Journal Article A two-stage model of research and development with endogenous second-mover advantages, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier (1985) View citations (30) (1985)
39. Practical Implications of Game Theoretic Models of R and D
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
40. Research and Development with a Generalized Hazard Function
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
41. The Economics of Income Taxation: Compliance in a Principal-Agent Framework
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

1982

42. Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
    See also Journal Article Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly, American Economic Review, American Economic Association (1983) View citations (362) (1983)

1981

43. Technology Adoption Under Imperfect Information
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
    See also Journal Article Technology Adoption Under Imperfect Information, Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation (1983) View citations (28) (1983)
44. The Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
    Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science View citations (1)

1980

45. A Note on Rational Threats and Competitive Equilibrium
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

1978

46. A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion
    Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion, Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press (1979) View citations (219) (1979)

Undated

47. A Class of Differential Games Where the Closed-Loop and Open-Loop Nash Equilibria Coincide
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
48. A Dynamic Game of R & D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
49. Dynamic Games of Innovation
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
    See also Journal Article Dynamic games of innovation, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier (1981) View citations (95) (1981)
50. Innovation and Industry Evolution
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
    See also Journal Article Innovation and Industry Evolution, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College (1985) View citations (139) (1985)
51. Market Structure and the Diffusion of New Technology
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
    See also Journal Article Market Structure and the Diffusion of New Technology, Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation (1981) View citations (136) (1981)
52. Nash Equilibrium Search for the Best Alternative
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
    See also Journal Article Nash equilibrium search for the best alternative, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier (1983) View citations (10) (1983)
53. Oligopoly Extraction of a Nonrenewable Common Property Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
54. On the Diffusion of New Technology: A Game Theoretic Approach
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
    See also Journal Article On the Diffusion of New Technology: A Game Theoretic Approach, The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd (1981) View citations (196) (1981)
55. Strategic Lobbying Behavior
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
56. Strategic Search Theory
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
    See also Journal Article Strategic Search Theory, International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association (1982) View citations (17) (1982)
57. The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
    See also Journal Article The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press (1986) View citations (181) (1986)

Journal Articles

2021

1. Prosecutor Quality, Witness Participation, Crime, and Reform
   American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2021, 13, (4), 64-100

2020

2. Reducing Unjust Convictions: Plea Bargaining, Trial, and Evidence Disclosure
   (“Prosecutorial Resources, Plea Bargaining, and the Decision to Go to Trial)
   The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2020, 36, (2), 378-414 View citations (2)

2018

3. Evidence Suppression by Prosecutors: Violations of the Brady Rule
   The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2018, 34, (3), 475-510 View citations (3)

2016

4. Informal Sanctions on Prosecutors and Defendants and the Disposition of Criminal Cases
   The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2016, 32, (2), 359-394 View citations (10)
5. Platform-Intermediated Trade with Uncertain Quality
   Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2016, 172, (1), 35-39 View citations (1)
6. Selecting among Acquitted Defendants: Procedural Choice versus Selective Compensation
   Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2016, 172, (1), 113-133 View citations (3)
   Also in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2016, 172, (1), 113-133 (2016) View citations (3)

2014

7. Cumulative Harm and Resilient Liability Rules for Product Markets
   The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2014, 30, (2), 371-400 View citations (19)
   See also Working Paper Cumulative Harm and Resilient Liability Rules for Product Markets, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers (2011) View citations (2) (2011)
8. The Effect of Third-Party Funding of Plaintiffs on Settlement
   American Economic Review, 2014, 104, (8), 2552-66 View citations (6)
   See also Working Paper The effect of third-party funding of plaintiffs on settlement, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers (2013) View citations (2) (2013)

2013

9. Cumulative Harm, Products Liability, and Bilateral Care
   American Law and Economics Review, 2013, 15, (2), 409-442 View citations (8)
   See also Working Paper Cumulative Harm, Products Liability, and Bilateral Care, IAST Working Papers (2013) View citations (8) (2013)
10. Search, bargaining, and signalling in the market for legal services
    RAND Journal of Economics, 2013, 44, (1), 82-103 View citations (6)

2011

11. A dynamic model of lawsuit joinder and settlement
    RAND Journal of Economics, 2011, 42, (3), 471-494 View citations (12)
    See also Working Paper A Dynamic Model of Lawsuit Joinder and Settlement, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers (2009) View citations (3) (2009)

2010

12. Population-Based Liability Determination, Mass Torts, and the Incentives for Suit, Settlement, and Trial
    The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2010, 26, (3), 460-492 View citations (1)
13. Public Goods, Social Pressure, and the Choice between Privacy and Publicity
    American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2010, 2, (2), 191-221 View citations (43)

2009

14. Hidden Talents: Entrepreneurship and Pareto‐Improving Private Information
    Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2009, 18, (3), 901-934 View citations (4)
    See also Chapter Hidden Talents: Entrepreneurship and Pareto-Improving Private Information, NBER Chapters, 2007 (2007) (2007)

2008

15. Communicating quality: a unified model of disclosure and signalling
    RAND Journal of Economics, 2008, 39, (4), 973-989 View citations (49)
    See also Working Paper Communicating Quality: A Unified Model of Disclosure and Signaling, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers (2007) View citations (6) (2007)
16. Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer. Comment
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2008, 164, (1), 24-26
17. Imperfect competition and quality signalling
    RAND Journal of Economics, 2008, 39, (1), 163-183 View citations (51)
    See also Working Paper Imperfect Competition and Quality Signaling, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers (2005) View citations (10) (2005)
18. Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2008, 164, (1), 106-126 View citations (29)
    See also Working Paper Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers (2006) View citations (3) (2006)

2007

19. Competition and confidentiality: Signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, 58, (1), 94-120 View citations (47)
    See also Working Paper Competition and Confidentiality: Signaling Quality in a Duopoly when there is Universal Private Information, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers (2004) View citations (2) (2004)

2006

20. Markets, torts, and social inefficiency
    RAND Journal of Economics, 2006, 37, (2), 300-323 View citations (37)
    See also Working Paper Markets, Torts and Social Inefficiency, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers (2003) View citations (10) (2003)

2005

21. Secrecy and Safety
    American Economic Review, 2005, 95, (4), 1074-1091 View citations (34)
    See also Working Paper Secrecy and Safety, Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings (2004) View citations (1) (2004)

2004

22. Exploiting Future Settlements: A Signalling Model of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Bargaining
    RAND Journal of Economics, 2004, 35, (3), 467-485 View citations (4)
    See also Working Paper Exploiting Future Settlements: A Signalling Model of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses In Settlement Bargaining, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers (2002) View citations (1) (2002)
23. Market Structure and the Demand for Free Trade
    Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2004, 13, (1), 125-150 View citations (10)
    See also Working Paper Market Structure and the Demand for Free Trade, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers (2002) (2002)

2003

24. Found Money? Split-Award Statutes and Settlement of Punitive Damages Cases
    American Law and Economics Review, 2003, 5, (1), 134-164 View citations (17)
    See also Working Paper Found Money? Split-Award Statutes and Settlement of Punitive Damages Cases, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers (2001) (2001)

2002

25. Informational Externalities in Settlement Bargaining: Confidentiality and Correlated Culpability
    RAND Journal of Economics, 2002, 33, (4), 587-604 View citations (25)

2000

26. Appealing Judgments
    RAND Journal of Economics, 2000, 31, (3), 502-526 View citations (32)
27. On the Economics of Trials: Adversarial Process, Evidence, and Equilibrium Bias
    The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2000, 16, (2), 365-94 View citations (63)
28. Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial Discretion, and Plea Bargaining
    RAND Journal of Economics, 2000, 31, (1), 62-81 View citations (15)

1999

29. Hush Money
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1999, 30, (4), 661-678 View citations (7)
30. Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive Influence and Herding Behavior by Courts
    American Law and Economics Review, 1999, 1, (1-2), 158-89 View citations (35)

1998

31. A Note on Multiple Equilibria and Punitive Damages Rules in "Everybody Out of the Pool."
    The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1998, 14, (2), 379-87

1997

32. Everybody Out of the Pool: Products Liability, Punitive Damages, and Competition
    The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1997, 13, (2), 410-32 View citations (29)

1995

33. Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1995, 26, (2), 203-221 View citations (25)
    See also Working Paper Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations As Evidence in Court, Game Theory and Information (1994) (1994)
34. Product Safety: Liability, R&D, and Signaling
    American Economic Review, 1995, 85, (5), 1187-1206 View citations (118)
    See also Working Paper Product Safety: Liability, R & D and Signaling, Working Papers (1994) View citations (20) (1994)

1994

35. Asymmetric Information Acquisition and Behavior in Role Choice Models: An Endogenously Generated Signaling Game
    International Economic Review, 1994, 35, (4), 795-819 View citations (33)
36. Settlement negotiations with two-sided asymmetric information: Model duality, information distribution, and efficiency
    International Review of Law and Economics, 1994, 14, (3), 283-298 View citations (47)
    See also Working Paper Settlement Negotiations with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution and Efficiency, Game Theory and Information (1994) View citations (48) (1994)

1993

37. Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation
    The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1993, 9, (2), 314-48 View citations (28)
    See also Working Paper Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation, Working Papers (1991) (1991)

1992

38. Search Equilibrium with Endogenous Recall
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1992, 23, (2), 184-202 View citations (15)

1991

39. Endogenous Availability in Search Equilibrium
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1991, 22, (2), 287-306 View citations (8)
40. Equilibrium Enforcement and Compliance in the Presence of Tax Practitioners
    The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1991, 7, (1), 163-81 View citations (24)
    See also Working Paper Equilibrium Enforcement and Compliance in the Presence of Tax Practitioners, Working Papers (1990) (1990)

1988

41. A Note on Enforcement Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance
    The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1988, 103, (4), 793-798 View citations (32)
42. Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion
    American Economic Review, 1988, 78, (4), 713-28 View citations (95)
    See also Working Paper Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, Working Papers (1986) (1986)

1986

43. Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance
    International Economic Review, 1986, 27, (3), 739-60 View citations (141)
44. Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1986, 17, (4), 557-566 View citations (172)
45. The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement
    The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1986, 2, (1), 1-32 View citations (181)
    See also Working Paper The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement, Working Papers

1985

46. A two-stage model of research and development with endogenous second-mover advantages
    International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1985, 3, (3), 275-292 View citations (30)
    See also Working Paper A Two-Stage Model of Research and Development With Endogenous Second Mover Advantages, Working Papers (1983) (1983)
47. Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework
    Journal of Public Economics, 1985, 26, (1), 1-18 View citations (225)
48. Innovation and Industry Evolution
    The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1985, 100, (1), 81-99 View citations (139)
    See also Working Paper Innovation and Industry Evolution, Working Papers
49. Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
    International Economic Review, 1985, 26, (1), 161-73 View citations (95)

1984

50. Practical Implications of Game Theoretic Models of R&D
    American Economic Review, 1984, 74, (2), 61-66 View citations (35)
51. Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly: Reply
    American Economic Review, 1984, 74, (1), 243-46 View citations (15)

1983

52. Nash equilibrium search for the best alternative
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1983, 30, (1), 139-152 View citations (10)
    See also Working Paper Nash Equilibrium Search for the Best Alternative, Working Papers
53. Technology Adoption Under Imperfect Information
    Bell Journal of Economics, 1983, 14, (1), 57-69 View citations (28)
    See also Working Paper Technology Adoption Under Imperfect Information, Working Papers (1981) (1981)
54. Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly
    American Economic Review, 1983, 73, (4), 741-48 View citations (362)
    See also Working Paper Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly, Working Papers (1982) (1982)

1982

55. A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior
    Econometrica, 1982, 50, (3), 671-88 View citations (120)
56. Strategic Search Theory
    International Economic Review, 1982, 23, (1), 1-17 View citations (17)
    See also Working Paper Strategic Search Theory, Working Papers

1981

57. Dynamic games of innovation
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1981, 25, (1), 21-41 View citations (95)
    See also Working Paper Dynamic Games of Innovation, Working Papers
58. Market Structure and the Diffusion of New Technology
    Bell Journal of Economics, 1981, 12, (2), 618-624 View citations (136)
    See also Working Paper Market Structure and the Diffusion of New Technology, Working Papers
59. On the Diffusion of New Technology: A Game Theoretic Approach
    The Review of Economic Studies, 1981, 48, (3), 395-405 View citations (196)
    See also Working Paper On the Diffusion of New Technology: A Game Theoretic Approach, Working Papers

1979

60. A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion
    Journal of Political Economy, 1979, 87, (4), 851-58 View citations (219)
    See also Working Paper A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion, Discussion Papers (1978) View citations (1) (1978)

Chapters

2018

1. Market structure, liability, and product safety
   Chapter 9 in Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II, 2018, pp 225-247 View citations (5)

2013

2. Economic analysis of products liability: Theory
   Chapter 3 in Research Handbook on the Economics of Torts, 2013, pp 69-96 View citations (17)
   See also Working Paper Economic Analysis of Products Liability: Theory, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics (2011) View citations (4) (2011)

2012

3. Settlement
   Chapter 15 in Procedural Law and Economics, 2012
   See also Working Paper Settlement, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics (2008) View citations (1) (2008)

2007

4. Hidden Talents: Entrepreneurship and Pareto-Improving Private Information
   A chapter in Entrepreneurship: Strategy and Structure, 2007
   See also Journal Article Hidden Talents: Entrepreneurship and Pareto‐Improving Private Information, Wiley Blackwell (2009) View citations (4) (2009)

1989

5. The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusion
   Chapter 14 in Handbook of Industrial Organization, 1989, vol. 1, pp 849-908 View citations (349)