Settlement

Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum ()

No 808, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers from Vanderbilt University Department of Economics

Abstract: This survey of the modeling of pretrial settlement bargaining organizes current main themes and recent developments. The basic concepts used are outlined as core models and then several variations on these core models are discussed. The focus is on articles that emphasize formal models of settlement negotiation and the presentation in the survey is organized in game-theoretic terms, this now being the principal tool employed by analyses in this area, but the discussion is aimed at the not-terribly-technical non-specialist. The survey also illustrates some of the basic notions and assumptions of information economics and of (cooperative and noncooperative) game theory.

Keywords: Settlement; bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/vu08-w08.pdf First version, 2008 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Chapter: Settlement (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:van:wpaper:0808

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers from Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().