On the Economics of Trials: Adversarial Process, Evidence, and Equilibrium Bias

Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum ()

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2000, vol. 16, issue 2, 365-94

Abstract: The adversarial provision of evidence is modeled as a game in which two parties engage in strategic sequential search. An axiomatic approach is used to characterize a court's decision based on the evidence provided. Although this process treats the evidence submissions in an unbiased way, the equilibrium outcome may still exhibit bias. Bias arises from differences in the cost of sampling or asymmetry in the sampling distribution. In a multistage model, a prodefendant bias arises in the first stage from a divergence between the parties' stakes. Finally, the adversarial process generates additional costs that screen out some otherwise meritorious cases. Copyright 2000 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 2000
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