Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion

Jennifer Reinganum ()

American Economic Review, 1988, vol. 78, issue 4, 713-28

Abstract: A model of plea bargaining with asymmetric information is presented. The prosecutor's private information consists of the strength of the case, while the defendant's private information consists of h is guilt or innocence. In equilibrium, a fraction of cases are dismis sed because they are too likely to involve an innocent defendant; in the remaining cases, the prosecutor's offer of a sentence in exchange for a plea of guilty reveals the strength of the case. It is shown t hat unlimited prosecutorial discretion may be socially disadvantageou s since it carries with it the requirement of sequential rationality. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.

Date: 1988
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