Prosecutor Quality, Witness Participation, Crime, and Reform

Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum ()

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2021, vol. 13, issue 4, 64-100

Abstract: We develop a model wherein concerns about prosecutor quality reduce the willingness of witnesses to cooperate with prosecutors. This causes an increase in the crime rate and in wrongly convicted innocent defendants. Because citizens are taxpayers and may be victims, perpetrators, witnesses, or falsely accused defendants, they care about the prosecutor's quality. They update beliefs about this quality based on the disposition of cases. If the prosecutor's believed quality falls below a threshold, then a majority of voters chooses to replace the prosecutor with a challenger, in expectation of reform. We compare the majority's choice with that of a social planner.

JEL-codes: D83 K41 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200039

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