The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement

Michael J. Graetz, Jennifer Reinganum (jennifer.f.reinganum@vanderbilt.edu) and Louis L. Wilde

No 589, Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

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Published in Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 2 (1986):1-32

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Journal Article: The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement (1986)
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