Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies

Salvador Barberà (), Dolors Berga and Bernardo Moreno ()

American Economic Review, 2016, vol. 106, issue 4, 1073-99

Abstract: Many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only strategy-proof, but also group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition, hence diminishing the traditional conflict between incentives and efficiency. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost sharing, house allocation, and auctions, in spite of the substantive disparity between these cases. In a general framework encompassing all of them, we prove that the equivalence between the two forms of strategy-proofness is due to an underlying common structure that transcends the many differences between the contexts and the mechanisms for which it holds. (JEL C78, D44, D63, D71, D82)

JEL-codes: C78 D44 D63 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20141727
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

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Working Paper: Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies (2015)
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