Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies
Salvador Barberà (),
Dolors Berga and
Bernardo Moreno ()
No 801, Working Papers from Barcelona Graduate School of Economics
Many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only strategy- proof, but also group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition, hence diminishing the traditional conflict between incentives and efficiency. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost sharing, house allocation and auctions, in spite of the substantive disparity between these cases. In a general framework encompassing all of them, we prove that the equivalence between the two forms of strategy-proofness is due to an underlying common structure, that transcends the many differences between the contexts and the mechanisms for which it holds.
Keywords: Matching; division; house allocation; cost sharing; auctions; strategy- proofness; richness; group strategy-proofness; joint monotonicity; respectfulness; non-bossiness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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Journal Article: Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:801
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