Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms

Shengwu Li

American Economic Review, 2017, vol. 107, issue 11, 3257-87

Abstract: A strategy is obviously dominant if, for any deviation, at any information set where both strategies first diverge, the best outcome under the deviation is no better than the worst outcome under the dominant strategy. A mechanism is obviously strategy-proof (OSP) if it has an equilibrium in obviously dominant strategies. This has a behavioral interpretation: a strategy is obviously dominant if and only if a cognitively limited agent can recognize it as weakly dominant. It also has a classical interpretation: a choice rule is OSP-implementable if and only if it can be carried out by a social planner under a particular regime of partial commitment.

JEL-codes: D11 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20160425
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (227)

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