Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms

Shengwu Li

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: A strategy is obviously dominant if, for any deviation, at any information set where both strategies first diverge, the best outcome under the deviation is no better than the worst outcome under the dominant strategy. A mechanism is obviously strategy-proof (OSP) if it has an equilibrium in obviously dominant strategies. This has a behavioral interpretation: A strategy is obviously dominant iff a cognitively limited agent can recognize it as weakly dominant. It also has a classical interpretation: A choice rule is OSP-implementable iff it can be carried out by a social planner under a particular regime of partial commitment.

Keywords: microeconomic theory; mechanism design; market design; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D01 D03 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (232)

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Journal Article: Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms (2017)
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