Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment

Sergiu Hart, Ilan Kremer and Motty Perry

American Economic Review, 2017, vol. 107, issue 3, 690-713

Abstract: An evidence game is a strategic disclosure game in which an informed agent who has some pieces of verifiable evidence decides which ones to disclose to an uninformed principal who chooses a reward. The agent, regardless of his information, prefers the reward to be as high as possible. We compare the setup in which the principal chooses the reward after the evidence is disclosed to the mechanism-design setup where he can commit in advance to a reward policy, and show that under natural conditions related to the evidence structure and the inherent prominence of truth, the two setups yield the same outcome.

JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20150913
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (50)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20150913 (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... TgLkakW83wXoKOeyHNFr (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... Z8AVjJyoTPcwPGMV6Biv (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment (2015)
Working Paper: Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment (2015)
Working Paper: Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment (2015)
Working Paper: Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:3:p:690-713

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo

More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().