Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment

Sergiu Hart, Ilan Kremer and Motty Perry

No 270003, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Abstract: An evidence game is a strategic disclosure game in which an informed agent who has some pieces of verifiable evidence decides which ones to disclose to an uninformed principal who chooses a reward. The agent, regardless of his information, prefers the reward to be as high as possible. We compare the setup where the principal chooses the reward after the evidence is disclosed to the mechanism-design setup where he can commit in advance to a reward policy. The main result is that under natural conditions on the truth structure of the evidence, the two setups yield the same equilibrium outcome.

Keywords: Financial; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 53
Date: 2015-12-12
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Related works:
Journal Article: Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment (2017)
Working Paper: Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment (2015)
Working Paper: Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment (2015)
Working Paper: Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:270003

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.270003

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