Assortative Matching under Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Malawi
Manuela Angelucci and
Daniel Bennett ()
American Economic Review, 2017, vol. 107, issue 5, 154-57
Asymmetric information is a key feature of the marriage market. In HIV-endemic settings, HIV risk is an important partner attribute that may influence marriage timing and partner selection. We use a sample of married women in rural Malawi to validate a model of positive assortative matching under asymmetric information. Several correlations support this framework, suggesting that HIV risk contributes to adverse selection in the marriage market in this setting.
JEL-codes: C78 D82 I12 J12 J16 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171055
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