Team Incentives and Performance: Evidence from a Retail Chain
Guido Friebel (),
Miriam Krueger and
Nick Zubanov ()
American Economic Review, 2017, vol. 107, issue 8, 2168-2203
In a field experiment with a retail chain (1,300 employees, 193 shops), randomly selected sales teams received a bonus. The bonus increases both sales and number of customers dealt with by 3 percent. Each dollar spent on the bonus generates $3.80 in sales, and $2.10 in profit. Wages increase by 2.2 percent while inequality rises only moderately. The analysis suggests effort complementarities to be important, and the effectiveness of peer pressure in overcoming free-riding to be limited. After rolling out the bonus treatment, and control shops' performance converge, suggesting long-term stability of the treatment effect.
JEL-codes: D22 J31 J33 L25 L81 M53 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20160788
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Working Paper: Team incentives and performance: Evidence from a retail chain (2017)
Working Paper: Team incentives and performance: Evidence from a retail chain (2015)
Working Paper: Team Incentives and Performance: Evidence from a Retail Chain (2015)
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