The Costs of Patronage: Evidence from the British Empire

Guo Xu

American Economic Review, 2018, vol. 108, issue 11, 3170-98

Abstract: I combine newly digitized personnel and public finance data from the British colonial administration for the period 1854-1966 to study how patronage affects the promotion and incentives of governors. Governors are more likely to be promoted to higher salaried colonies when connected to their superior during the period of patronage. Once allocated, they provide more tax exemptions, raise less revenue, and invest less. The promotion and performance gaps disappear after the abolition of patronage appointments. Patronage therefore distorts the allocation of public sector positions and reduces the incentives of favored bureaucrats to perform.

JEL-codes: D73 F54 H83 J45 M51 N43 N44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20171339
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (75)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.20171339 (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... ZdN5oaNzzxYSl8Zue43X (application/zip)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... ia2FqcsjCdMKyzE0SuE1 (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... 4eD6pnHyrivHoRYfU_u2 (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:108:y:2018:i:11:p:3170-98

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo

More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().