Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent? Sorting, Selection, and Productivity in the Delivery of Public Services

Nava Ashraf, Oriana Bandiera, Edward Davenport and Scott S. Lee

American Economic Review, 2020, vol. 110, issue 5, 1355-94

Abstract: We embed a field experiment in a nationwide recruitment drive for a new health care position in Zambia to test whether career benefits attract talent at the expense of prosocial motivation. In line with common wisdom, offering career opportunities attracts less prosocial applicants. However, the trade-off exists only at low levels of talent; the marginal applicants in treatment are more talented and equally prosocial. These are hired, and perform better at every step of the causal chain: they provide more inputs, increase facility utilization, and improve health outcomes including a 25 percent decrease in child malnutrition.

JEL-codes: H83 I11 I13 J24 M51 O15 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (71)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Losing prosociality in the quest for talent? Sorting, selection, and productivity in the delivery of public services (2020)
Working Paper: Losing prosociality in the quest for talent? Sorting, selection, and productivity in the delivery of public services (2018)
Working Paper: Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent? Sorting, Selection, and Productivity in the Delivery of Public Services (2014)
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DOI: 10.1257/aer.20180326

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