Losing prosociality in the quest for talent? Sorting, selection, and productivity in the delivery of public services
Oriana Bandiera and
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
We embed a field experiment in a nationwide recruitment drive for nurses in Zambia to test whether career benefits attract talent at the expense of prosocial motivation. We randomize the offer of career benefits at the recruitment stage. In line with common wisdom, treatment attracts less prosocial applicants. However, the trade-off only exists at low levels of talent; the marginal applicants in treatment are more talented and equally pro-social. These are hired, and they perform better at every step of the chain: they deliver more services, promote institutional childbirth, and reduce child malnutrition by 25% in the communities they serve.
JEL-codes: J1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent? Sorting, Selection, and Productivity in the Delivery of Public Services (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:88175
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