Incentivized Kidney Exchange

Tayfun Sönmez, Utku Unver and M. Bumin Yenmez

American Economic Review, 2020, vol. 110, issue 7, 2198-2224

Abstract: Over the last 15 years, kidney exchange has become a mainstream paradigm to increase transplants. However, compatible pairs do not participate, and full benefits from exchange can be realized only if they do. We propose incentivizing compatible pairs to participate in exchange by insuring their patients against future renal failure via increased priority in deceased-donor queue. We analyze equity and welfare benefits of this scheme through a new dynamic continuum model. We calibrate the model with US data and quantify substantial gains from adopting incentivized exchange, both in terms of access to living-donor transplants and reduced competition for deceased-donor transplants.

JEL-codes: D47 I11 I12 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Working Paper: Incentivized Kidney Exchange (2018)
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DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170950

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