Incentivized Kidney Exchange

Tayfun Sönmez, Utku Unver and M. Bumin Yenmez

No 931, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: Over the last 15 years, kidney exchange has become a mainstream paradigm to increase transplants. However, compatible pairs do not participate, and the full benefits from exchange can be realized only if they do. We propose incentivizing compatible pairs to participate in exchange by insuring their patients against future renal failure via increased priority in the deceased-donor queue. Efficiency and equity analyses of this scheme are conducted and compared with that of kidney exchange in a new dynamic continuum model. We calibrate the model with US data and quantify substantial gains from adopting incentivized exchange in efficiency and access equity.

Keywords: Market design; organ allocation; kidney exchange; equity; efficiency; compatible pairs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-06-30, Revised 2018-04-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-gth
Note: A earlier version of this paper appears as WP 868.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Journal Article: Incentivized Kidney Exchange (2020)
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