Incentivized Kidney Exchange
Tayfun Sönmez (),
Utku Unver () and
M. Bumin Yenmez
No 931, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics
Over the last 15 years, kidney exchange has become a mainstream paradigm to increase transplants. However, compatible pairs do not participate, and the full benefits from exchange can be realized only if they do. We propose incentivizing compatible pairs to participate in exchange by insuring their patients against future renal failure via increased priority in the deceased-donor queue. Efficiency and equity analyses of this scheme are conducted and compared with that of kidney exchange in a new dynamic continuum model. We calibrate the model with US data and quantify substantial gains from adopting incentivized exchange in efficiency and access equity.
Keywords: Market design; organ allocation; kidney exchange; equity; efficiency; compatible pairs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D47 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-gth
Date: 2017-06-30, Revised 2018-04-15
Note: A earlier version of this paper appears as WP 868.
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