What Motivates Paternalism? An Experimental Study

Sandro Ambuehl, B. Douglas Bernheim and Axel Ockenfels
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Sandro Ambühl

American Economic Review, 2021, vol. 111, issue 3, 787-830

Abstract: We study experimentally when, why, and how people intervene in others' choices. Choice Architects (CAs) construct opportunity sets containing bundles of time-indexed payments for Choosers. CAs frequently prevent impatient choices despite opportunities to provide advice, believing Choosers benefit. They violate common behavioral welfare criteria by removing impatient options even when all pay-offs are delayed. CAs intervene not by removing options they wish they could resist when choosing for themselves (mistakes-projective paternalism), but rather as if they seek to align others' choices with their own aspirations (ideals-projective paternalism). Laboratory choices predict subjects' support for actual paternalistic policies.

JEL-codes: C92 D12 D15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (44)

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DOI: 10.1257/aer.20191039

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