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Self-Persuasion: Evidence from Field Experiments at International Debating Competitions

Peter Schwardmann, Egon Tripodi and Joël J. van der Weele

American Economic Review, 2022, vol. 112, issue 4, 1118-46

Abstract: Laboratory evidence shows that when people have to argue for a given position, they persuade themselves about the position's factual and moral superiority. Such self-persuasion limits the potential of communication to resolve conflict and reduce polarization. We test for this phenomenon in a field setting, at international debating competitions that randomly assign experienced and motivated debaters to argue one side of a topical motion. We find self-persuasion in factual beliefs and confidence in one's position. Effect sizes are smaller than in the laboratory, but robust to a one-hour exchange of arguments and a tenfold increase in incentives for accuracy.

JEL-codes: C93 D12 D72 D83 D91 I23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200372

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