Personalized Pricing and Competition

Andrew Rhodes and Jidong Zhou

American Economic Review, 2024, vol. 114, issue 7, 2141-70

Abstract: We study personalized pricing in a general oligopoly model. The impact of personalized pricing relative to uniform pricing hinges on the degree of market coverage. If market conditions are such that coverage is high (e.g., the production cost is low or the number of firms is high), personalized pricing harms firms and benefits consumers, whereas the opposite is true if coverage is low. When only some firms have data to personalize prices, consumers can be worse off compared to when either all or no firms personalize prices.

JEL-codes: D21 D43 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1257/aer.20221524

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