Personalized Pricing and Competition

Andrew Rhodes and Jidong Zhou
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Andrew Rhodes: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Jidong Zhou: Yale University [New Haven]

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Abstract: We study personalized pricing in a general oligopoly model. The impact of personalized pricing relative to uniform pricing hinges on the degree of market coverage. If market conditions are such that coverage is high (e.g., the production cost is low or the number of firms is high), personalized pricing harms firms and benefits consumers, whereas the opposite is true if coverage is low. When only some firms have data to personalize prices, consumers can be worse off compared to when either all or no firms personalize prices.

Date: 2024-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in American Economic Review, 2024, 114 (7), pp.2141-2170. ⟨10.1257/aer.20221524⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04691711

DOI: 10.1257/aer.20221524

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