An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators
David Bloom and
Christopher L Cavanagh
American Economic Review, 1986, vol. 76, issue 3, 408-22
This paper analyzes alternative mechanisms for the selection of arbitrators. The authors review key institutional features of the threemost prevalent mechanisms for selecting arbitrators: rank/veto, alternate strike, and rotating panel. They present a more formal analysis in which these mechanisms are treated as economic games, andanalyze the alternative mechanisms in terms of the incentives they provide for strategic behavior and the efficiency of any equilibrium strategies that exist. Some implications of varying selected parametersof each mechanism are derived and the general role of arbitrator selection mechanisms in the process of bargaining under the threat ofarbitration are considered. Copyright 1986 by American Economic Association.
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