An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators
David Bloom and
Christopher L. Cavanagh
No 1938, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
This paper analyses data on union and employer rankings of different panels of arbitrators in an actual arbitration system. A random utility model of bargainer preferences is developed and estimated. The estimates indicate that unions and employers have similar preferences, in favor of lawyers, more experienced arbitrators, and arbitrators who seem to have previously favored their side. Alternative rankings models, which are estimated to test whether bargainers rank arbitrators strategically, reveal no evidence of strategic behavior.
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Published as Bloom, David E. and Christopher Cavanagh. "An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators," American Economic Review, June 1986, pp. 408-422.
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