Seniority and Monopsony in the Academic Labor Market
Michael Ransom ()
American Economic Review, 1993, vol. 83, issue 1, 221-33
Workers with high seniority usually have higher wages than workers with low seniority and the same total labor-marke t experience. In contrast, the results of this paper indicate that higher seniority is associated with lower salaries for university professors. The author documents this finding for national surveys a nd individual institutions and explains it as due to monopsonistic discrimination by employers. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.
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