Games with Procedurally Rational Players

Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein ()

American Economic Review, 1998, vol. 88, issue 4, 834-47

Abstract: The authors study interactive situations in which players are boundedly rational. Each player, rather than optimizing given a belief about the other players' behavior, as in the theory of Nash equilibrium, uses the following choice procedure. She first associates one consequence with each of her actions by sampling (literally or virtually) each of her actions once. Then she chooses the action that has the best consequence. The authors define a notion of equilibrium for such situations and study its properties. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.

Date: 1998
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Working Paper: Games with Procedurally Rational Players (1997)
Working Paper: Games with Procedurally Rational Players (1997)
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