Games with Procedurally Rational Players

Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein ()

Department of Economics Working Papers from McMaster University

Abstract: We study interactive situations in which players are boundedly ra- tional. Each player, rather than optimizing given a belief about the other players' behavior. as in the theory of Nash equilibrium, uses the following choice procedure. She first associates one consequence with each of her actions by sampling (literally or virtually) each of her actions once. Then she chooses the action that has the best consequence. We define a notion of equilibrium for such situations and study its properties.

JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1997-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Games with Procedurally Rational Players (1998)
Working Paper: Games with Procedurally Rational Players (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcm:deptwp:1997-02

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