The Generalized War of Attrition

Paul Klemperer and Jeremy Bulow

American Economic Review, 1999, vol. 89, issue 1, 175-189

Abstract: The authors model a war of attrition with N+K firms competing for N prizes. In a 'natural oligopoly' context, the K - 1 lowest-value firms drop out instantaneously, even though each firm's value is private information to itself. In a 'standard setting' context, in which every competitor suffers losses until a standard is chosen, even after giving up on its own preferred alternative, each firm's exit time is independent both of K and of other players' actions. The authors' results explain how long it takes to form a winning coalition in politics. Solving the model is facilitated by the revenue equivalence theorem.

JEL-codes: C13 D43 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.1.175
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (106)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Generalized War of Attrition (1999)
Working Paper: The Generalized War of Attrition (1997)
Working Paper: The Generalized War of Attrition (1997)
Working Paper: The Generalized War of Attrition (1996)
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