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The Generalized War of Attrition

Paul Klemperer () and Jeremy Bulow
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Jeremy Bulow: Stanford University

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: [Forthcoming, American Economic Review.] We model a War of Attrition with N+K firms competing for N prizes. If firms must pay their full costs until the whole game ends, even after dropping out themselves (as in a standard-setting context), each firm's exit time is independent both of K and of other players' actions. If, instead, firms pay no costs after dropping out (as in a natural oligopoly), the field is immediately reduced to N+1 firms. Furthermore, in this limit it is always the K-1 lowest-value firms who drop out in zero time, even though each firm's value is private information to itself.

Keywords: War; of; Attrition; Auctions; Standards; Natural; Monopoly; Oligopoly; Twoness; Strategic; Independence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D44 L13 O30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 1999-01-28
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HPLaserjet4mplus/PostScript; pages: 24 ; figures: none. We never published this piece and now we would like to reduce our mailing and xerox cost by posting it.
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Related works:
Journal Article: The Generalized War of Attrition (1999) Downloads
Working Paper: The Generalized War of Attrition (1997) Downloads
Working Paper: The Generalized War of Attrition (1997) Downloads
Working Paper: The Generalized War of Attrition (1996) Downloads
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