Gaming against Managers in Incentive Systems: Experimental Results with Chinese Students and Chinese Managers

David Cooper ()

American Economic Review, 1999, vol. 89, issue 4, 781-804

Abstract: We examine strategic interactions between firms and planners in China, comparing behavior between: (i) students and managers with field experience with this situation, (ii) standard versus increased monetary incentives, and (iii) sessions conducted "in context," making explicit reference to interactions between planners and managers, and those without any such references. The dynamics of play are similar across treatments with play only gradually, and incompletely, converging on a pooling equilibrium. A fivefold increase in incentives significantly increases initial levels of strategic play. Games played in context generated greater levels of strategic play for managers, with minimal impact on students.

JEL-codes: D82 P31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.4.781
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (164)

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Working Paper: Gaming against managers in incentive systems: Experimental results with chinese students and chinese managers (1999)
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