The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
Eric Maskin and
American Economic Review, 2004, vol. 94, issue 4, 1034-1054
We build a simple model to capture the major virtues and drawbacks of making public officials accountable (i. e., subjecting them to reelection): On the one hand, accountability allows the public to screen and discipline their officials; on the other, it may induce those officials to pander to public opinion and put too little weight on minority welfare. We study when decision-making powers should be allocated to the public directly (direct democracy), to accountable officials (called "politicians"), or to nonaccountable officials (called "judges").
Note: DOI: 10.1257/0002828042002606
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (222) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
Working Paper: The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government (2004)
Working Paper: The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:94:y:2004:i:4:p:1034-1054
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo
More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().