The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government

Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole

No 20, Economics Working Papers from Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science

Abstract: We build a simple model to capture the major virtues and drawbacks of making public officials accountable (i.e., subjecting them to reelection): On the one hand, accountablity allows the public to screen and discipline their officials; on the other, it may induce those officials to pander to public opinion and put too little weight on minority welfare. We study when decision-making powers should be allocated to the public directly (direct democracy), to accountable officials (called “politicians”), or to nonaccountable officials (called “judges”).

Keywords: Accountability; Pandering; Separation of Powers; Constitutional Design; Redistributive Politics; Minority Rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H1 H7 K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2004-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (437)

Published in American Economic Review, 94: 1034-1054

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government (2004)
Working Paper: The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government (2003)
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