A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers

Daniel Diermeier, Michael Keane () and Antonio Merlo

American Economic Review, 2005, vol. 95, issue 1, 347-373

Abstract: Our main goal is to quantify the returns to a career in the United States Congress. We specify a dynamic model of career decisions of a member of Congress and estimate this model using a newly collected dataset. Given estimates of the structural model, we assess reelection probabilities, estimate the effect of congressional experience on private and public sector wages, and quantify the value of a congressional seat. Moreover, we assess how an increase in the congressional wage or the imposition of term limits would affect the career decisions of politicians and the returns from a career in Congress.

Date: 2005
Note: DOI: 10.1257/0002828053828464
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Working Paper: A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers (2004)
Working Paper: A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers (2004)
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