A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers
Daniel Diermeier (),
Michael Keane () and
Antonio Merlo ()
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Daniel Diermeier: Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
Theories in political economy depend critically on assumptions about motivations of politicians. Our analysis starts from the premise that politicians, like other economic agents, are rational individuals who make career decisions by comparing the expected returns of alternative choices. The main goal of the paper is to quantify the returns to a career in the United States Congress. To achieve this goal we specify a dynamic model of career decisions of a member of Congress and we estimate this model using a newly collected data set. Given estimates of the structural model, we assess reelection probabilities for members of Congress, estimate the effect of congressional experience on private and public sector wages, and quantify the value of a congressional seat. Moreover, we use the estimated model to assess how an increase in the congressional wage or the imposition of term limits would affect the career decisions of politicians and the returns to a career in Congress.
Keywords: Political careers; politicians; elections; term limits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 J44 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
Date: 2002-07-01, Revised 2004-09-01
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Journal Article: A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers (2005)
Working Paper: A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:04-037
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