Advertising Content

Simon Anderson and Régis Renault

American Economic Review, 2006, vol. 96, issue 1, 93-113

Abstract: Empirical evidence suggests that most advertisements contain little direct information. Many do not mention prices. We analyze a monopoly firm's choice of advertising content and the information disclosed to consumers. The firm advertises only product information, price information, or both, and prefers to convey only limited product information if possible. It is socially harmful to force it to provide full information if it has sufficient ability to parse the information imparted, nor does it help to restrict the information voluntarily provided.

Date: 2006
Note: DOI: 10.1257/000282806776157632
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (135)

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Working Paper: Advertising Content (2005)
Working Paper: Advertising Content (2002)
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