Advertising Content

Simon Anderson and Régis Renault

No 5064, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Empirical evidence suggests that most advertisements contain little direct information. Many do not mention prices. We analyse a monopoly firm?s choice of advertising content and the information disclosed to consumers. The firm advertises only product information, price information, or both; and prefers to convey only limited product information if possible. It is socially harmful to force it to provide full information if it has sufficient ability to parse the information imparted, but nor does it help to restrict the information voluntarily provided.

Keywords: Informative advertising; Search; Content analysis; Information disclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 L15 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-05
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Related works:
Journal Article: Advertising Content (2006)
Working Paper: Advertising Content (2002)
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