Group Reputations, Stereotypes, and Cooperation in a Repeated Labor Market

Paul Healy ()

American Economic Review, 2007, vol. 97, issue 5, 1751-1773

Abstract: Reputation effects and other-regarding preferences have both been used to predict cooperative outcomes in markets with inefficient equilibria. Existing reputation-building models require either infinite time horizons or publicly observed identities, but cooperative outcomes have been observed in several moral hazard experiments with finite horizons and anonymous interactions. This paper introduces a full reputation equilibrium (FRE) with stereotyping (perceived type correlation) in which cooperation is predicted in early periods of a finitely repeated market with anonymous interactions. New experiments generate results in line with the FRE prediction, including final-period reversions to stage-game equilibrium and noncooperative play under unfavorable payoff parameters. (JEL C72, C73, C78, J41)

JEL-codes: C72 C73 C78 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.5.1751
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.97.5.1751 (application/pdf)
http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/dec07/20041118_data.zip (application/zip)
http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/dec07/20041118_app.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Group Reputations, Stereotypes, and Cooperation in a Repeated Labor Market
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:97:y:2007:i:5:p:1751-1773

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo

More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().