Group Reputations, Stereotypes, and Cooperation in a Repeated Labor Market

Paul Healy ()

No 2006-E6, GSIA Working Papers from Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business

Abstract: In a world of incomplete, unenforceable contracts, both reputation effects and fairness concerns have been suggested as mechanisms capable of avoiding or mitigating market failure. Existing experiments show that labor market failure can be avoided in the absence of individual reputations, apparently due to subjects' other-regarding preferences. This paper introduces a reputation equilibrium with stereotyping (modeled as a belief of type correlation) that predicts cooperation even when individual reputations effects are weak. New experiments show that cooperation emerges when such equilibria are likely to exist, but not when existence is unlikely.

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Journal Article: Group Reputations, Stereotypes, and Cooperation in a Repeated Labor Market (2007)
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