Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution

Stefano Demichelis and Jörgen Weibull

American Economic Review, 2008, vol. 98, issue 4, 1292-1311

Abstract: Language is a powerful coordination device. We generalize the cheap-talk approach to pre-play communication by way of introducing a meaning correspondence between messages and actions, and by postulating two axioms met by natural languages. Players have a lexicographic preference, second to material payoffs, against deviating from the meaning correspondence. Under two-sided communication in generic and symmetric nxn-coordination games, a Nash equilibrium component in such a lexicographic communication game is evolutionarily stable if and only if it results in the unique Pareto efficient outcome of the underlying game. We extend the analysis to one-sided communication in arbitrary finite two-player games. (JEL C72, C73, Z13)

JEL-codes: C72 C73 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.4.1292
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (91)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Language, meaning and games A model of communication, coordination and evolution (2009)
Working Paper: Language, meaning and games: a model of communication, coordination and evolution (2007)
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