Language, meaning and games A model of communication, coordination and evolution

Stefano Demichelis and Jörgen Weibull
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Stefano Demichelis: UNIPV - Università degli Studi di Pavia [Italia] = University of Pavia [Italy] = Université de Pavie [Italie]

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Abstract: Language is arguably a powerful coordination device in real-life interactions. We here develop a game-theoretic model of pre-play communication that generalizes the cheap-talk approach by way of introducing a meaning correspondence between messages and actions, and postulating two axioms met by natural languages. Deviations from this correspondence are called dishonest and players have a lexicographic preference for honesty, second to material payoffs. The model is first applied to two-sided preplay communication in finite and symmetric two-player games and we establish that, in generic and symmetric n × n - coordination games, a Nash equilibrium component in such a lexicographic communication game is evolutionarily stable if and only if it results in the unique Pareto efficient outcome of the underlying game. We extend the approach to one-sided communication in finite, not necessarily symmetric, two-player games.

Date: 2009-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00354224v1
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Related works:
Journal Article: Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution (2008)
Working Paper: Language, meaning and games: a model of communication, coordination and evolution (2007)
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