Decentralized Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation

Andreas Blume, John Duffy and April Franco

American Economic Review, 2009, vol. 99, issue 4, 1178-1205

Abstract: We experimentally study decentralized organizational learning. Our objective is to understand how learning members of an organization cope with the confounding effects of the simultaneous learning of others. We test the predictions of a stylized, rational agent model of organizational learning that provides sharp predictions as to how learning members of an organization might cope with the simultaneous learning of others as a function of fundamental variables, e.g., firm size and the discount factor. While the problem of learning while others are learning is quite difficult, we find support for the comparative static predictions of the model's unique symmetric equilibrium. (JEL C72, D23, D83)

JEL-codes: C72 D23 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.4.1178
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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