Individual Behavior and Group Membership: Comment

Matthias Sutter

American Economic Review, 2009, vol. 99, issue 5, 2247-57

Abstract: Charness et al. (2007b) have shown that group membership has a strong effect on individual decisions in strategic games when group membership is salient through payoff commonality. In this comment, I show that their findings also apply to nonstrategic decisions, even when no outgroup exists, and I relate the effects of group membership on individual decisions to joint decision making in teams. I find in an investment experiment that individual decisions with salient group membership are largely the same as team decisions. This finding bridges the literature on team decision making and on group membership effects. (JEL D71, D82, Z13)

JEL-codes: D71 D82 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.5.2247
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (150)

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Working Paper: Individual behavior and group membership: Comment (2008)
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