How Effective Are Monetary Incentives to Vote? Evidence from a Nationwide Policy

Mariella Gonzales, Gianmarco León-Ciliotta () and Luis Martinez ()

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2022, vol. 14, issue 1, 293-326

Abstract: We study voters' response to marginal changes to the fine for electoral abstention in Peru, leveraging variation from a nationwide reform. A smaller fine has a robust, negative effect on voter turnout, partly through irregular changes in voter registration. However, representation is largely unaffected, as most of the lost votes are blank or invalid. We also show that the effect of an exemption from compulsory voting is substantially larger than that of a full fine reduction, suggesting that nonmonetary incentives are the main drivers behind the effectiveness of compulsory voting.

JEL-codes: D72 K16 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: How Effective Are Monetary Incentives to Vote? Evidence from a Nationwide Policy (2019)
Working Paper: How Effective Are Monetary Incentives to Vote? Evidence from a Nationwide Policy (2019)
Working Paper: How effective are monetary incentives to vote? Evidence from a nationwide policy (2019)
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DOI: 10.1257/app.20200482

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