How Effective Are Monetary Incentives to Vote? Evidence from a Nationwide Policy
Gianmarco León-Ciliotta () and
No 13898, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
We combine two natural experiments, multiple empirical strategies and administrative data to study voters' response to marginal changes to the fi ne for electoral abstention in Peru. A smaller fi ne leads to a robust decrease in voter turnout. However, the drop in turnout caused by a full fi ne reduction is less than 20% the size of that caused by an exemption from compulsory voting, indicating the predominance of the non-monetary incentives provided by the mandate to vote. Additionally, almost 90% of the votes generated by a marginally larger fi ne are blank or invalid, lending support to the hypothesis of rational abstention. Higher demand for information and larger long-run eff ects following an adjustment to the value of the fine point to the existence of informational frictions that limit adaptation to institutional changes.
Keywords: compulsory voting; External Validity; Informational frictions; Peru; voter registration; Voter turnout (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 D83 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-law and nep-pol
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Working Paper: How Effective Are Monetary Incentives to Vote? Evidence from a Nationwide Policy (2019)
Working Paper: How effective are monetary incentives to vote? Evidence from a nationwide policy (2019)
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