Patient versus Provider Incentives in Long-Term Care

Martin B. Hackmann, R. Vincent Pohl and Nicolas Ziebarth ()

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2024, vol. 16, issue 3, 178-218

Abstract: How do patient and provider incentives affect the provision of long-term care? Our analysis of 551,000 nursing home stays yields three main insights. First, due to limited cost-sharing, Medicaid-covered residents prolong their nursing home stays instead of transitioning to community-based care. Second, when facility capacity binds, nursing homes shorten Medicaid stays to admit more profitable out-of-pocket private payers. Third, providers react more elastically to financial incentives than patients. Thus, targeting provider incentives through alternative payment models, such as episode-based reimbursement, is more effective than increasing patient cost sharing in facilitating transitions to community-based care and generating long-term care savings.

JEL-codes: H51 H75 I11 I13 I18 I38 L84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Related works:
Working Paper: Patient versus Provider Incentives in Long-Term Care (2023)
Working Paper: Patient versus provider incentives in long-term care (2023)
Working Paper: Patient Versus Provider Incentives in Long Term Care (2018)
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DOI: 10.1257/app.20210264

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