Patient Versus Provider Incentives in Long Term Care

Martin Hackmann, R. Vincent Pohl () and Nicolas Ziebarth ()

No 25178, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: How do patient and provider incentives affect the provision of long-term care? Our analysis of 551 thousand nursing home stays yields three main insights. First, Medicaid-covered residents prolong their stays instead of transitioning to community-based care due to limited cost-sharing. Second, when facility capacity binds, nursing homes shorten Medicaid stays to admit more profitable out-of-pocket private payers. Third, providers react more elastically to financial incentives than patients. Thus, targeting provider incentives through alternative payment models, such as episode-based reimbursement, is more effective than increasing patient cost-sharing in facilitating transitions to community-based care and generating long-term care savings.

JEL-codes: H51 H75 I11 I13 I18 J14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-ias
Note: AG EH IO PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published as Martin B. Hackmann & R. Vincent Pohl & Nicolas R. Ziebarth, 2024. "Patient versus Provider Incentives in Long-Term Care," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, vol 16(3), pages 178-218.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Patient versus Provider Incentives in Long-Term Care (2024)
Working Paper: Patient versus Provider Incentives in Long-Term Care (2023)
Working Paper: Patient versus provider incentives in long-term care (2023)
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