Civil Service Exams and Organizational Performance: Evidence from the Pendleton Act

Diana Moreira and Santiago Perez

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2024, vol. 16, issue 3, 250-91

Abstract: We use newly digitized data to study the impacts of a historical reform that mandated exams for some employees in the largest US customs-collection districts. Although the reform improved targeted employees' professional backgrounds and reduced turnover, it did not lead to significant improvements in the cost-effectiveness of customs revenue collection. The incomplete reach of the reform was key for this partial success. First, the reform incentivized hiring in exam-exempted positions, distorting districts' hierarchical structure. Second, since we find suggestive evidence that districts' top managers mattered for performance, not changing their appointment method might have constituted a missed opportunity for improvement.

JEL-codes: D23 D73 H83 J45 N31 N41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Working Paper: Civil Service Exams and Organizational Performance: Evidence from the Pendleton Act (2021)
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DOI: 10.1257/app.20220284

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