Civil Service Exams and Organizational Performance: Evidence from the Pendleton Act

Diana Moreira and Santiago Perez

No 28665, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Competitive exams are a standard method for selecting civil servants. Yet, there is limited evidence on their effectiveness. We digitize personnel and financial data to study the impacts of the 1883 Pendleton Act, which mandated exams for some employees in the largest US customs-collection districts. Although the act improved targeted employees’ professional background and reduced turnover, it did not increase cost-effectiveness in customs revenue collection. Moreover, it incentivized hiring in exam-exempted positions, distorting districts’ hierarchical structures. These results illustrate how, by triggering countervailing organizational responses, policies that succeed at improving specific organizational aspects might nevertheless fail to improve overall performance.

JEL-codes: H83 N41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
Note: DAE POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published as Diana Moreira & Santiago Pérez, 2024. "Civil Service Exams and Organizational Performance: Evidence from the Pendleton Act," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, vol 16(3), pages 250-291.

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Journal Article: Civil Service Exams and Organizational Performance: Evidence from the Pendleton Act (2024)
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